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Abstract
The anti-saccade task has been used to measure attentional control related to general anxi-
ety but less so with social anxiety specifically. Previous research has not been conclusive in
suggesting that social anxiety may lead to difficulties in inhibiting faces. It is possible that
static face paradigms do not convey a sufficient social threat to elicit an inhibitory response
in socially anxious individuals. The aim of the current study was twofold. We investigated
the effect of social anxiety on performance in an anti-saccade task with neutral or emotional
faces preceded either by a social stressor (Experiment 1), or valenced sentence primes
designed to increase the social salience of the task (Experiment 2). Our results indicated
that latencies were significantly longer for happy than angry faces. Additionally, and surpris-
ingly, high anxious participants made more erroneous anti-saccades to neutral than angry
and happy faces, whilst the low anxious groups exhibited a trend in the opposite direction.
Results are consistent with a general approach-avoidance response for positive and threat-
ening social information. However increased socio-cognitive load may alter attentional con-
trol with high anxious individuals avoiding emotional faces, but finding it more difficult to
inhibit ambiguous faces. The effects of social sentence primes on attention appear to be
subtle but suggest that the anti-saccade task will only elicit socially relevant responses
where the paradigm is more ecologically valid.
Introduction
Social anxiety can be induced by various social contexts including real or imagined perfor-
mance situations, personal interactions or being observed in public [1]. Information process-
ing biases such as increased or reduced attention to faces have important implications for the
developmental trajectory of social anxiety [2, 3]. Indeed, Bogels and Mansell [4] have
highlighted the potential relationship between attentional control (i.e., the way that individuals
can control their attention towards a goal-oriented stimuli and ignore an irrelevant stimuli)
and attentional biases in social anxiety. However, socially anxious individuals may differ in
their ability either to control their selective attention or their ability to ignore irrelevant stimuli
such as socially threatening faces. Our ability to attend to task relevant but ignore task-irrele-
vant stimuli relies on the interaction between bottom up sensory processing (salience driven)
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and top-down (goal driven) control. Valence (i.e. the degree to which a stimulus is associated
with threat or reward) is an important component of salience [5]. Attentional Control Theory
[6] models the influence of anxiety on performance and has four central tenets.
Firstly, anxiety impairs the functioning of the attention-like central executive [7]. Following
from this, functions of the central executive are differentially vulnerable to anxiety, with influ-
ences being detectable on the inhibitory and attentional shifting roles of the central executive
(see [8, 9]). Failures to inhibit task irrelevant stimuli and responses can lead to task perfor-
mance disruption, whilst shifting impairments impede the efficient and flexible allocation of
our attention to the current set of task relevant stimuli. The final tenet of the theory relates to
the argument that anxiety generally impairs processing efficiency more than performance
effectiveness [6, 10].
Automatically generated expectancies of negative outcomes in social situations are believed
to be a hallmark of social anxiety. Rapee and Heimberg [11] argue that individuals with social
anxiety are overburdened by attention to social cues of a negative nature, whilst Clark and
Wells [12] would argue that social anxiety is exacerbated by a reduced attention to positive
social cues. To date though the data from studies using static face processing paradigms has
provided mixed evidence for either model. Some studies have provided evidence for enhanced
attention to threat faces [13, 14, 15, 16, 17] others have found that this is followed by avoidance
[14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21]. Yet other studies have failed to find any evidence of attentional biases
in socially anxious people [22, 23, 24, 25, 26]. Such conflicting results should of course be
viewed in the context of the diverse paradigms, stimuli, sample sizes and social anxiety mea-
sures used, and highlight a number of unresolved issues in the field; much is still missing from
our understanding of face processing in social cognition.
The interpretation of facial expressions does not in reality occur in isolation from the con-
text in which faces are viewed. This may go some way to accounting for the equivocal findings
in the literature. An event such as having to make a speech is an unsettling social engagement
for socially anxious individuals because they have tangible social cues to respond to [27]. Such
anxiety provoking situations are not captured in a static face paradigm, and studies that have
used this technique lack adequate representation of the cues and threats that are encountered
in real social situations. In performance situations, if the anxious person expects to have a neg-
ative evaluation of their social performance (i.e. indicating that the audience is bored or unim-
pressed) then seeing a frowning or bored face may elicit enhanced salience from such a face,
reinforcing their negative expectations.
However, being thus aware, the individual may also be able to increase their efforts to con-
centrate on performing well, which may lead to apparent avoidance of the face. Therefore,
congruency between the expectation of a social evaluation and the facial expression may have
a direct bearing on the individual’s ability to rapidly process and respond to the faces. If the
perceived facial expression is not consistent with expectations (i.e. positive or ambiguous), the
processes may be slowed whilst the expression is re-evaluated. Since studying information
biases in realistic everyday situations is highly challenging, one way to improve the ecological
validity of static face paradigms, and their influence on real behavior, would be to increase the
socio-cognitive load experienced by the individual during the task, by introducing factors
which enhance the self-relevance of the facial expression experienced. This could be achieved
either by presenting a social stressor, whereby the participant is aware that the static face task
will be followed by a live performance which will be evaluated, or by introducing a social con-
text more directly through priming techniques.
These methods when applied to traditional static face processing tasks may elicit effects that
have previously been masked. For example, in a laboratory setting the anti-saccade task [28]
has the potential to be an excellent paradigm to assess anxiety related deficits in attentional
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control. Anti-saccade tasks measure inhibition by requiring participants to ignore an attention
grabbing irrelevant stimulus (thereby suppressing a prepotent reflexive response) and make a
volitional saccade in the opposite direction. A pro-saccade task on the other hand merely
requires the generation of a stimulus driven, reflexive saccade to a target. To perform an anti-
saccade, participants are required to suppress the urge to be drawn to a target which would
naturally elicit automatic allocation of attention and make a saccade away from it so as to
deliberately focus their attention away from the target. Target stimuli in such tasks can be as
simple as monochrome shapes or as complex as real-world scenes. Performance is typically
measured in terms of rates of erroneous pro-saccades to stimuli and saccadic latencies of suc-
cessful anti-saccades (e.g. [29]).
Antisaccade tasks have been used in samples with generalised anxiety disorder (GAD). For
example, Derakshan et al. [30] found that a high compared to low anxiety group exhibited lon-
ger latencies to the first correct saccade when the face was angry relative to happy or neutral
faces. This suggests that increased anxiety leads to processing inefficiency to threat because of
difficulties inhibiting the threat stimulus but that it does not impact on performance, as there
were no differences in error rates. Rather, trait anxious individuals are likely to compensate by
making more effort to employ strategies to control performance [31] in line with Attentional
Control Theory [6].
To our knowledge Wieser, Pauli and Muhlberger [32] first tested attentional control in
social anxiety using an anti-saccade task, although without any contextual element. They
found that highly socially anxious participants rated all avatar facial expressions more nega-
tively than low anxious participants. However, eye movement results indicated that whilst high
socially anxious participants made significantly more errors than the moderately anxious par-
ticipants they did not do so in relation to low anxious participants. A group specific compensa-
tory strategy in the high anxious, relative to low anxious participants, should involve faster
saccades away from emotional faces with fewer errors compared to neutral face performance.
It is possible that these somewhat paradoxical findings reflect individual differences within
groups as individual differences in working memory capacity may be responsible for goal-ori-
ented performance deficits, with those lower in working memory finding it more difficult to
inhibit distractions [33].
In order to maximally employ the anti-saccade task to model behaviour in individuals high
in social anxiety we would argue that a robust attempt is made to minimise potential differ-
ences in how participants approach the task. A demonstrably stronger avoidant pattern of sac-
cadic behaviour may emerge when potential task effects in the anti-saccade task (as indicated
by the large standard deviations, e.g. [32]) are reduced by increasing the social threat of the
task. This can be attained by adding either a social stressor or providing evaluation informa-
tion prior to stimulus onset. Indeed, behavioural changes have already been demonstrated in
some static face paradigms where threat or stress is manipulated to assess biases in attention in
social anxiety, with vigilant attention patterns switching to avoidant patterns under such cir-
cumstances [34, 35]. If such a manipulation was undertaken in an anti-saccade task then high
socially anxious participants may in fact demonstrate lower error rates and faster saccadic
latencies away from threatening faces because they have increased stimulus avoidance
responses compared to less anxious individuals.
An additional issue that has not been sufficiently addressed in static face paradigms that
attempt to stimulate realistic social behaviors in social anxiety relates to the nature of the sti-
muli employed themselves. It may be a significant challenge for socially anxious individuals
to inhibit a neutral face during a performance task because of the emotional ambiguity of such
a face. To an individual high in social anxiety, a neutral face, rather than portraying no emo-
tion, may be perceived as a mask of emotion, as a ‘poker face’, and may require increased
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processing, as has been suggested by the increase in right amygdala activity in response to neu-
tral faces found in previous research [36, 37, 38].
The left amygdala is thought to be more specialised for salience driven fear processing,
local, high-spatial frequency information and dynamic processing. In contrast, the right amyg-
dala is implicated in emotional evaluation, low-spatial frequency information, global process-
ing and processing of ambiguous stimuli [39, 40, 41]. The right amygdala may be activated
through a sub cortical route involving the superior colliculus and pulvinar [39]. Furthermore,
Diano et al. [42] reviewed literature on amygdala responses in the absence of direct attention
and concluded that the amygdala can be activated without direct awareness through the supe-
rior colliculus and pulvinar.
In addition to differential processing of neutral faces, there is also some evidence that
socially anxious individuals process emotional words differently than neutral words. For
example, Amir and Bomyea [43] found that individuals with social phobia had greater working
memory capacity for emotional than neutral words but the pattern was reversed in non-phobic
individuals. This was thought to be due to increased anxiety and rumination during the task,
which is in line with notion that constraining cognitive resources results in performance defi-
cits for neutral social stimuli, as advocated by Attentional Control Theory [6].
Bearing in mind the aforementioned individual differences in compensatory strategies, if
the social threat is high enough, socially anxious individuals may be more likely to try to avoid
emotional faces and less likely to look at the face in error. Yet what may be assumed to be
avoidance of an emotional face may in fact be a statistical artifact of comparing performance
relative to an eroded baseline ability to inhibit neutral faces because of the ambiguity of the
meaning of the expression, and the strain that the socio-evaluative processing may then place
on the working memory system [43]. Clearly this has powerful implications for the interpreta-
tion of data from studies that employ such stimuli.
To adequately assess performance in an anti-saccade task with neutral stimuli a control
stimulus such as an inverted face should additionally be employed. Inverted faces have been
shown to be less susceptible to configural processing in particular than upright faces [44, 45] in
other words to be less likely to be treated as a whole face ’object’. Indeed, investigating the
visual ‘pop out’ effect, Brown, Huey and Findlay [46] found that in peripheral vision, upright
faces were processed more efficiently than inverted faces. Furthermore, Gilchrist and Proske
[47] showed that an upright face was subject to a higher error rate in the anti-saccade task than
an inverted face due to its high-level properties making it more likely to attract attention.
Inverted faces are thus perceived as a different class of object to faces as we normally process
them, and act as a better control for comparing behaviour to faces.
The current study therefore evaluated attentional control with emotional, neutral and
inverted faces across social anxiety levels under conditions of increased socio-cognitive load.
Thus, strengthening the design adopted by Wieser et al. [32]. Experiment 1 incorporated a
design featuring a social stressor via an anticipated social performance [48]. Experiment 2
employed stimuli preceded by prime statements, similar to those used in our previous study of
self-referential primes and social perception in a general sample, which influenced perception
but not direct attention in respect of emotional categorisation of facial expressions [49]. For
the current experiments, it was hypothesised that there would be faster latencies away from
angry faces in the anti-saccade task, reflecting anger as a general social threat, but that this
effect would be intensified by social anxiety. Furthermore, there should be lower errors to
emotional faces relative to neutral upright faces in the high compared to the low anxiety
group, with the low anxiety group exhibiting the opposite pattern.
Experiment 1 is in line with Mullins and Duke [50] who found that self-report post-test
state anxiety was significantly higher in participants who had performed a face processing task
Social anxiety and inhibition
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0197749 May 24, 2018 4 / 24
who were told that they would subsequently be asked to deliver a speech to an audience who
would evaluate their performance. Therefore, participants in the current study were given the
speech task information prior to completing the anti-saccade task in order to increase their
social stress whilst completing the anti-saccade task.
Experiment 2, employed either neutral, positive self-referential or negative non-self-refer-
ential primes. We followed the premise that socio-cognitive load will facilitate the aforemen-
tioned hypotheses in the neutral prime condition, but that these effects will be attenuated by
non-socially threatening primes. A pro-saccade task was also added to Experiment 2 and it
was predicted that there would be fewer errors made in the pro than anti-saccade task, as is
typically reported in tasks employing both pro and anti-saccade task, e.g. [46, 51].
Method (Experiment 1)
Participants
170 Participants were initially recruited to complete an online survey but of these only 92 were
willing to complete a subsequent experimental stage. One participant was withdrawn because
it transpired that she was being treated for depression. Another was withdrawn because she
had a diagnosis of Asperger’s syndrome. One more participant was withdrawn because of an
equipment failure during the experiment. Therefore, data from 89 participants were analysed.
Participants were recruited through the University of Strathclyde’s virtual learning environ-
ment; posters displayed around the campus and local businesses; local classified ads and com-
munity websites. Participants were initially invited to participate in return for being entered
into a draw for a £50 prize, a £5 Amazon voucher or a course credit (for undergraduate
students).
Inclusion criteria included English speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision,
free from visual deficits. Exclusion criteria included a history of substance abuse for the past
two years; a current or recent psychiatric disorder or neurological illness. The study was given
ethical approval by the University of Strathclyde School of Psychological Sciences and Health
Ethics Committee.
Participants were split into high (32), moderate (27) and low (30) social anxiety groups
(HSA, MSA and LSA respectively) based the third percentile of scores, i.e. [52, 53] on the
online 8-item Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation scale II (BFNE II) [54] which has an internal
consistency coefficient alpha of .97.
General social anxiety was measured on the 17-item Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN) [55]
which measures five aspects of social phobia including social inadequacy (i.e. fear and avoid-
ance of social situations); self-esteem (i.e. fear and avoidance of criticism); physiological symp-
toms (i.e. fear of loss of bodily control); social inferiority (i.e. fear and avoidance of authority)
and performance anxiety (i.e. fear of public attention). The scale has generally been found to
have very good psychometric properties [56] and is correlated with both the Social Phobia
Scale to a high degree, and moderately with the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale [57] with coef-
ficients of (.71) and (.60) respectively [48]. Current negative mood and anxiety were measured
by administering the self-report 21 item self-report Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II) [58,
59] and the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) [60] (Beck, Epstein, Brown & steer, 1988). The
BDI-II has high reliability, with a coefficient alpha of .93 for undergraduate students and .92
for clinically depressed participants, whilst the BAI has also been demonstrated to have high
internal consistency with a coefficient alpha of .91. Additionally, self-focused attention was
measured with the Private and Public Body Consciousness Scale (BCS) [61].
Participant demographics. The sample was comprised 51 females and 38 male partici-
pants. A 2x3 ġ2 test showed that the gender was equally distributed across the three anxiety
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groups, ġ2 (2) = 2.83, p = 0.24. Participant’s ages ranged from 17 to 60 and years of education
ranged from 12 to 24 years. A series of one-way ANOVAs were conducted for age, education,
BCS, BFNE, SPIN, BDI, and BAI scores between anxiety groups. Main effects and Bonferroni
post hoc significance values are presented in Table 1.
Participants did not differ in terms of age or education across the three groups. Addition-
ally, no differences between groups were observed for self-focused attention measured with
the BCS [61]. However, the three groups were statistically differentiated on measures of anxiety
and depression. On the BFNE measure, a Welchs’ test confirmed this. Bonferroni contrasts
showed that the HSA group had significantly higher fear of negative evaluation scores than the
MSA and LSA groups, with additional differences observed between the latter two groups. A
one-way ANOVA on SPIN scores also revealed group differences. Follow-up analysis indi-
cated that HSA participants had significantly higher scores than MSA and LSA groups, with
the latter two groups also significantly differing. Additionally, general anxiety scores on the
BAI were compared. Following a significant ANOVAmain effect contrasts revealed that HSA
participants had significantly higher general anxiety scores than LSA participants. However,
there were no significant differences between the MSA group and either the HAS or LSA
group. Finally, for depression scores, an ANOVA on BDI data was significant, with subsequent
Bonferroni contrasts revealing that HSA participants had significantly higher depression
scores than LSA participant, but did not differ fromMSA participants. Furthermore, there was
no significant difference between the MSA and the LSA groups.
Anti-saccade task
30 photo face stimuli: 5 male (models 21M; 24M; 28M; 33M; 34M) and 5 female models 03F;
05F; 06F; 08F; 09F) displaying angry, happy and neutral expressions were selected from the
NimStim Set of Facial Expressions [62]. A control (inverted neutral face) stimulus was also
included, from each model. Stimuli were presented twice for a total of 80 trials, and were ran-
domised across participants.
Faces were presented equally to either the right or left of the screen at an eccentricity of
10.1˚ from the centre of the screen and were presented on a black background at a visual angle
of 15.2˚ in height and 11.3˚ in width. Dimensions replicated those used by Wieser et al. [32].
Faces were all Caucasian with an even gender balance. Differences in hair and size were con-
trolled by framing the pictures with standardised ovals.
Table 1. Mean, standard deviations and statistical comparisons for participant demographics: Experiment 1.
Participant characteristics
HSA
M(SD)
MSA
M(SD)
LSA
M(SD)
F p HSA
LSA
HSA
MSA
LSA
MSA
BFNE 30.9(3.1) 23.5(1.7) 16.2(3.3) 167.21 < .001   
SPIN 28.6(1.7) 20.5(1.9) 11.5(1.8) 23.8 < .001   
BCS 33.5(10.1) 31.9(10.5) 30.0(12.1) 0.78 .46
BDI-II 12.1(1.3) 9.0(1.4) 6.7(1.4) 4.23 .02 
BAI 12.5(9.5) 9.5(1.5) 6.2(1.5) 4.69 .02 
Age 23(2) 29(2) 27(2) 3.6 .04Ⴃ
Education 16.7(2.6) 16.6(3.8) 16.6(2.8) .02 .98
sig at .001
 sig at .01
 sig at .05
Ⴃ Bonferroni contrasts were not significant
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0197749.t001
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Eye movement recording. The stimuli were centrally presented on a 19 inch, 85 Hz View-
sonic G90ft 19 inch colour monitor with its resolution set to 1280 × 1024. Eye movements
were recorded with an SR EyeLink II (SR Research, Ontario, Canada) using the centre of the
pupil to define pupil position. Eye movements were recorded at a 500 Hz sample rate. Saccade
onset was defined as a change in eye position with a minimum velocity of 18˚/s or a minimum
acceleration of 8000˚/s. The programs that controlled the software were designed in-house
using Experiment Builder Version 1.10.1025 (SR Research, Ontario, Canada).
Procedure
The BFNE II [54] was completed online, delivered via Qualtrics survey provider (Qualtrics
Ltd, Utah, USA). Consent was obtained by clicking on an onscreen consent box. Participants
were then asked to attend the University to complete the experimental phase of the study,
prior to which they again read the information sheet and signed a consent form.
During this phase, which lasted for approximately 1 hour, participants were seated 57cm
from the monitor and wore a lightweight SR Research headset comprising a head camera and
two eye cameras placed just below the eyes. Before commencing the task, participants were
asked to complete the Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN); Beck Depression Inventory II [58, 59];
Beck Anxiety Inventory [60] and the Body Consciousness Scale. Questionnaires [61] were
administered prior to the task because of the potential effect of the task priming responses.
Following questionnaire completion, participants were told that they would first be asked
to participate in a short face processing task and that this would be followed by an interview
in front of a live panel who would be evaluating their performance. They were not given
any specific information about this. The subsequent anti-saccade task was preceded by 12
practice trials where participants were offered an opportunity to ask for clarity on the task
instructions.
Immediately prior to the task, a nine-point calibration sequence was conducted, which was
repeated at the start of each trial block. Participants gaze was recorded while fixated on a cen-
tral white fixation dot with a diameter of 0.5˚ presented on a black screen and by thereafter
tracking their gaze as they followed the dot sequentially around the nine grid points on the
screen. Successful calibration was followed by a repetition of the process during the validation
stage. At the start of each trial, participants were presented with a central drift correction fixa-
tion dot for 500ms, which they were asked to fixate before being presented with a face to either
the left or right of the screen for 1000ms.
Data analysis
Data were analysed using SR Research Data Viewer version 1.9.1 (SR Research Ltd, Ontario,
Canada). The first saccade after onset of the face was taken as the saccadic measure. Latencies
were calculated from the target onset to the onset of the first saccade and latencies of<80ms
were discarded as anticipatory saccades. Initial fixations which were>1˚ from the central fixa-
tion point were also excluded as were saccadic amplitudes under 2˚. This led to an average of
4.63% of trials for each participant being excluded. Percentages of erroneous anti-saccades and
mean latencies were analysed relative to the number of valid trials across each participant. Eye
movement data were analysed in a series of mixed 3 x 4 ANOVAs with one between groups
factor: anxiety (high/moderate/low) and one within group factor: face type (angry upright;
happy upright; inverted neutral and neutral upright). Dependent variables included mean
latency from central fixation point to target for correct anti-saccades and the mean percentage
of erroneous pro-saccades.
Social anxiety and inhibition
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Results
Latency data
A 3x4 repeated measures ANOVA with one between group factor (anxiety) and one repeated
measures factor (face type) was conducted on saccadic latency data. Although the data failed
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for the HSA group on angry faces, k-s(32) = 0.16, p = 0.04, and
for the MSA group with inverted faces, k-s(27) = 0.2, p = 0.01, it was normal for all other vari-
ables. However, Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated,
(ġ2 (5) = 677.8, p< 0.001) therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using the Greenhouse
Geisser estimates of sphericity (ď = 0.69). However, whilst the Levene’s test for each face type
were non-significant for angry and inverted faces (p> 0.07), it was significant for happy faces,
F(2,86) = 4.46, p = 0.01 and for neutral faces F(2,86) = 5.62, p = 0.01.
As ANOVAmay not be robust enough under these conditions as the appropriate technique
for subsequent analysis [63] the results were analysed using a series of non-parametric tests. A
Kruskal-Wallis test revealed no differences between anxiety groups for angry faces,H(2) =
0.36, p = 0.83; happy faces,H(2) = 0.51, p = 0.77; inverted faces,H(2) = 4.57, p = 0.1 or neutral
faces,H(2) = 0.69, p = 0.71. Additionally, a Friedman’s test was conducted to examine potential
differences in response latencies across emotions. This analysis revealed a borderline effect,
ġ2(3) = 7.83, p = .05. Follow-up Bonferroni-corrected Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests for 6 com-
parisons (setting an alpha of .0083) revealed lower latencies to respond to inverted faces
(Mdn = 255.79 ms) relative to happy faces (Mdn = 263.56 ms) Z = 2.86, p = .004, r = .30. There
was also a directionally similar borderline significant difference between inverted faces and
angry faces (Mdn = 261.68 ms), Z = 2.50, p = .001, r = .30. The remaining four comparisons
inverted v neutral; happy v neutral; angry v neutral and happy v angry were all non-significant
(p = .15; p = .16; p = .11; p = .73) respectively.
Error data
A 3x4 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted, with one between group factor (anxiety)
and one repeated measures factor (face valence) for error rate. Although the data failed the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests primarily due to a skew towards 0 scores, Mauchly’s test indicated
that the assumption of sphericity could be assumed, (ġ2(5) = 7.8, p = 0.17) and the Levene’s
test for each face type were non-significant (p> 0.43) so ANOVA should be robust enough
under these conditions to use for the analysis [62]. Results revealed no significant main effect
for face valence, F(3,258) = 0.67,MSE = 0.05, p = 0.57, Pđ2 = 0.01, power = 0.19 and no signifi-
cant main effect of anxiety, F(2, 86) = 77.98,MSE = 0.09, p = 0.61, Pđ2 = 0.01, power = 0.13 or
anxiety x valence interaction, F(2, 86) = 2.33,MSE = 0.01, p = 0.1, Pđ2 = 0.05, power = 0.46.
Discussion
Participants were asked to perform an anti-saccade task to emotional, neutral and inverted
faces whilst under a condition of apprehensive social stress. It was predicted that the social
stressor would induce faster latencies away from angry faces in the anti-saccade task, and that
this would be intensified by degree of social anxiety. However, no differences in latencies were
found across anxiety groups or face types. There was some evidence however of a face inver-
sion effect with a significant difference between upright happy and inverted faces and a bor-
derline effect for the difference in latencies between angry upright and inverted faces.
This latter finding only partially supports previous findings such as Brown, Huey and Find-
lay [46] which suggested that upright faces were processed more efficiently, since no inversion
effect was found for neutral upright compared to inverted faces. It is possible that the social
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relevance of inverted neutral faces may have been inflated by cognitions and anxiety about the
anticipated concept of being evaluated, regardless of participants’ dispositional social anxiety.
The effect of increased social salience may have been stronger for error rates which showed no
evidence of inversion effects.
Furthermore, it was hypothesised that there would be lower errors to emotional faces rela-
tive to neutral upright faces in the high compared to the low anxiety group, who would exhibit
the opposite pattern. Again, this hypothesis was not supported as no significant group differ-
ences or effects of face type were found. These findings differ from those of Wieser et al. [32]
who found differences in error rates across the high and moderate anxiety groups.
It is possible that the social stressor was not strong or consistent enough to demonstrate the
predicted effect. By providing a greater controlled context in experiment 2, we may be able to
homogenise the degree of social attachment that participants feel to the stimuli they are
exposed to, and more readily control the degree of socially influenced attention that partici-
pants apply to experimental trials. In the first study a speech threat was used but it is possible
that although there may have been some low-level awareness of this, the mechanical task
demands may have remained powerful enough to distract subsets of participants enough to
forget the forthcoming speech task for periods during task engagement. Therefore, the antici-
pated effects that would be driven by the forthcoming speech task may have again been masked
to some extent. Experiment 2 should provide a stronger test of our thesis.
Experiment 2
Socially anxious individuals are thought to draw upon negative self-relevant memories, which
in turn lead to expectations of negative evaluation in social situations. Thus as Rapee and
Heimberg [11] suggested, attention to social information is dependent on congruency between
expectations and perception. Increasing the social evaluative context of static emotional faces
may elicit the types of responses that would more naturally occur in a social situation than
would occur in typical static face paradigms. A highly socially anxious person is likely to gener-
ate a continuous series of negative self-referential thoughts throughout a task rather than to
generate these prior to the task [11] as was the case in Experiment 1. Increasing socio-cognitive
load by introducing contextual factors through priming may result, in itself, in a constantly
updated evaluation-based attention cycle.
Indeed, we have successfully demonstrated the influence of sentence primes on cognitions,
particularly when primes and emotional expressions have been congruent. Our findings indi-
cated that in a general population, negative self-referential primes reduced self-esteem, partic-
ularly when paired with a face perceived as negative [49]. We anticipated that socially anxious
individuals would automatically generate such self-referential negative primes. Therefore, we
did not seek to add an additional layer of threat to the current study, but to enhance the self-
relevance of the task to make it more ecologically valid.
When introducing primes with a social component care must be taken to ensure the manip-
ulation is merely adding a socio-cognitive load. The purpose of such primes should be to afford
a measure of the effect of generic socio-cognitive load rather than impending social threat.
Therefore, the social prime types selected should be non-threating in nature. One way of
achieving this is to direct negative social information away from the participant and towards
another hypothetical character. Another is to direct positive social information towards the
participant. In addition to neutral primes, we shall employ both types of non-threatening
social prime in the following experiment.
It should be stated that we do not view neutral primes to be merely ‘filler’ stimuli in this
study, rather we anticipate that they shall effectively foster natural levels of background
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thought in participants, which in the case of individuals with higher levels of social anxiety
should be very likely to feature the generation of negative self-referential thoughts. Conversely,
non-self-referential primes and positive self-referential primes may reduce the personal social
threat of the faces viewed, compared to the natural generation of a negative self-referential
internal narrative that socially anxious individuals would be expected to generate in social con-
texts, and in the context of our neutral primes. A positive self-referential prime should lead a
participant to expect that a non-socially threatening face would appear afterwards in the con-
text of an anti-saccade task. Similarly, a negative non-socially threatening prime, whilst nega-
tive, should not signal a social threat because it directs the negative response away from the
participant to another cause. This means that what is being investigated is simply the effect of
socio-cognitive load, where increased socio-evaluative processing may occur, rather than a
threat prime where threat specific processing is likely to occur.
It was expected that socially anxious individuals would be likely to generate negative self-
referential thoughts in response to a neutral prime where a direct reason for the expression of
the face was not provided. In contrast, non-socially threatening emotional primes that did
explain the reason for the expression would be expected to attenuate the generic effect of
socio-cognitive load in a way that neutral primes are unlikely to do. Thus, in this experiment
wel had a prime type that mimics reality by providing non-directive thoughts to accompany
the visual stimuli (with their inherent capacity to facilitate participants thought processes), and
two prime types that had a clear social component which enhance the social salience of the
task without increasing social threat.
We added a pro-saccade task for Experiment 2 to ensure task effectiveness since we were
introducing an additional variable, thereby making the task more complex. We expected to
observe fewer errors made in the pro-saccade than in the anti-saccade task, and lower latencies
for correct saccades in the pro-saccade condition relative to the anti-saccade condition. With
specific regard to the primes employed in experiment 2, Van Peer et al. [64] have suggested
that there is a general approach-avoidance response for happy and angry faces. This may
reflect the strength of angry faces in terms of negative evaluation whilst happy faces indicate
positive evaluation. It was therefore hypothesised that there would be a general approach-
avoidance response for happy and angry faces, characterised by longer latencies to saccade
away from happy faces and shorter latencies for angry faces, but that this effect would be inten-
sified by the groups’ degree of social anxiety, particularly with neutral primes. Furthermore,
there would be lower errors to emotional faces relative to neutral upright faces in the high
compared to the low anxiety group in the anti-saccade task with neutral primes, but this latter
effect would be attenuated by non-socially threating primes.
Method
Participants
Initially, 136 participants were recruited through adverts displayed around the campus and
local businesses; local classified ads and community websites. Participants were invited to par-
ticipate in return for being entered into a draw for a £50 prize. Inclusion and exclusion criteria
were as Experiment 1. All participants provided informed consent to take part in the study,
and local ethical approval was again obtained.
From the original survey respondents 76 participants who were naive to the purpose of the
study completed the experiment. However, two participants were withdrawn as they had clini-
cal levels of depression and revealed after the experiment that they were receiving medication
to treat this. Another two participants were withdrawn as their level of English was deemed
not to be at a level to have understood the task instructions. Thus, data from 72 participants
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were analysed. Participants were again split into high (24), moderate (24) and low (24) anxiety
groups (HSA, MSA and LSA respectively) based the third percentile of scores on the online
8-item BFNE II [54].
Social anxiety was again also measured using the SPIN, whilst current negative mood and
anxiety were measured by BDI-II and BAI respectively. Additionally in this study, to investi-
gate the relationship between self-report attentional control and performance, participants
completed the 20-item Attentional Control Scale (ACS) [65], which has a high internal consis-
tency with a coefficient alpha of .88. The ACS is a self-report questionnaire which measures
focused attention including inhibition and task shifting, with items such as “When I need to
concentrate and solve a problem, I have trouble focusing my attention” and “It is easy for me
to alternate between two different tasks”. Responses on a four point Likert scale range from, 1
(almost never) to 4 (always). Scores can range from 20 to 80 with higher scores indicating
stronger attentional control.
Participant demographics
The sample was comprised of 51 female and 21 male participants but a 2x3 ġ2 test showed that
the gender was equally distributed across the three groups, ġ2 (2) = 2.82, p = .24. Participant’s
ages ranged from 18 to 57 and years of education ranged from 11 to 24. A series of one-way
ANOVAs were conducted for age, education, BFNE, SPIN, BDI, BAI and ACS scores. Main
effects and Bonferroni post hoc significance values are presented in Table 2.
Participants across groups also did not differ in terms of age or education across the three
groups, but were reliably differentiated on social anxiety measures. However, higher scores for
the high anxiety group relative to the low anxiety group for both depression and general anxi-
ety were also observed. Additionally, the borderline significantly lower ACS scores for the high
relative to the low anxiety group may suggest that the highly socially anxious participants had
less confidence in their ability to control their attention than their less anxious counterparts.
Design
In order to measure the effect of the task, eye movement data were initially analysed in a pair
of mixed four way ANOVAs with one between groups factor: anxiety group (high/medium/
low) and three within group factors: condition (pro-saccade/anti-saccade); prime (neutral;
positive self-referential (SR); negative non-self-referential (NSR)) and face type (angry; neutral;
Table 2. Mean, standard deviations and statistical comparisons for participant demographics: Experiment 2.
Participant characteristics
HSA
M(SD)
MSA
M(SD)
LSA
M(SD)
F p HSA
LSA
HSA
MSA
LSA
MSA
BFNE 31.5(2.9) 22(2.4) 14.6(2.6) 242.74 < .001   
SPIN 31(12.9) 20.6(8.6) 12(7.2) 22.56 < .001   
ACS 48.4(8.7) 51.6(6.1) 53.7(7.3) 3.07 .05 
BDI-II 11.8(7.8) 10.1(6.6) 6.7(6) 3.49 .04 
BAI 13(8.2) 10.6(8.1) 6.4(7.2) .31 .02 
Age 26(8) 31(12) 31(11) 2.7 .08
Education 16.3(2.7) 16.9(3) 16.4(3) .1 .65
sig at .001
 sig at .01
 sig at .05
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0197749.t002
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happy; inverted neutral face). The dependent variables were again mean latencies towards or
away from the target (in pro and anti-saccade trials respectively), and percentages of erroneous
anti-saccades, analysed relative to the number of valid trials across each participant. To sim-
plify the analysis following the investigation of a task effect, a series of mixed three way ANO-
VAs were then computed for the pro-saccade and anti-saccade tasks separately.
Prime validation. In order to validate the neutrality of the neutral primes employed and
the effectiveness of the target negative non-self-referential primes as being less threatening
than negative self-referential primes, and the positive self-referential primes as being more
positively perceived than a positive non-self-referential context, a total of 400 primes were ini-
tially generated for the validation procedure. These included 80 primes of each of five sentence
types: positive self-referential (SR); negative self-referential (SR); positive non-self-referential
(NSR); negative non-self-referential (NSR) and neutral. Each statement was comprised of six
words to standardize the length. Seventeen participants were asked to rate both the valence of
statements presented on paper on an 11-point scale ranging from –5 (very negative) to 0 (neu-
tral) to +5 (very positive) (after e.g. [66]), and degree of self-reference ranging from –5 (defi-
nitely self-referential) to 0 (neutral) to +5 (definitely other-referential).
A repeated measures one-way ANOVA with five levels of valence (positive SR; negative SR;
positive NSR; negative NSR and neutral) revealed a significant main effect, F(1.14,18.25) =
363.14,MSE = 1.15, p< .001, partial đ2 = .96. Bonferroni comparisons revealed that negative
NSR primes (M = -2.37, SE = .01) were rated significantly more negatively than positive NSR
primes (M = 2.36, SE = .13, p< .01) or neutral primes (M = 0.02, SE = .01, p< .01) but signifi-
cantly less negative than negative SR primes (M = -2.96, SE = .15). Positive SR primes were
rated significantly more positively than negative SR primes (M = -2.37, SE = .13, p< .001) and
neutral primes (p< .001).
Final statements were selected from the original list on the basis of the most extreme
valence for emotional primes (i.e. 5 on the Likert scale rather than 4) and the lowest valance
for neutral primes (i.e. the primes with ratings closest to 0). A further 1-way repeated measures
ANOVA was conducted for the final prime set, which revealed a significant main effect of
valence, F(1.11, 17.73) = 482.25,MSE = .6, p< .001, partial đ2 = .97. Bonferroni contrasts
showed that negative NSR sentences were rated significantly more negatively (M = -3.12, SE =
.15) than neutral (M = .01, SE = .01, p< .001) or positive SR sentences (M = 3.04, SE = .14, p<
.001), which were rated significantly more positively than neutral sentences. Although negative
NSR primes were rated as more negative than neutral primes, a significant main effect of refer-
ence was also found in a 1-way repeated measures ANOVA, F(1.23, 19.69) = 319.93,MSE =
1.13, p< .001, partial đ2 = .95. Bonferroni contrasts showed that negative NRS sentences were
rated significantly more as referring to others (M = -3.3, SE = .22) than neutral (mean = 0,
SE = 0) or positive SR sentences (M = 3.92, SE = .23), which were rated significantly more self-
referential than neutral sentences.
In the interests of reducing the length of the experimental block, which at 400 trials would
be extremely long for an eye tracking study in terms of participant fatigue, the number of
primes was reduced. It was important to retain the neutral primes to control the narrative to
some extent. However, it was reasoned that socially anxious individuals would be likely to gen-
erate their own negative self-referential internal narrative, negating the need to provide these
additionally. Therefore, by way of comparison, we attempted to reduce the social threat by
providing a low threat-controlled narrative through non-threat sentence primes. As the analy-
sis above suggests negative non-self-referential primes are likely to be less socially threatening
than neutral primes because they direct the negative information away from the individual.
Additionally, we included positive primes directed towards the individual. Thus, in the present
study, three prime types were included: neutral, positive (SR) self-referential and negative
Social anxiety and inhibition
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0197749 May 24, 2018 12 / 24
non-self-referential (NSR). This gave rise to 240 primes (80 neutral, 80 negative non-self-refer-
ential and 80 positive self-referential). An example of a positive SR prime was ‘Sara is
impressed by your speech’ while a negative NSR prime was, ‘Sara is annoyed with her boss’
and a neutral prime example was ‘Sara takes the train to work’.
Apparatus and stimuli
Forty face photos were used. This was comprised of 5 male and 5 female models consisting of
angry, happy and neutral expressions again selected from the NimStim Set of Facial Expres-
sions [62]. A control inverted neutral face stimulus was also included (only a neutral face was
included to keep trial numbers manageable).
Trials (n = 240) were split into two blocks of 120 pro-saccade and 120 anti-saccade trials
with 40 trials for each prime type employing the same face stimuli equally in both blocks of
trials. Presentation order of blocks was counterbalanced amongst participants. Stimuli pre-
sentation order was also randomised across participants. Faces with each prime type were
equally presented to the right or left of the screen at a visual angle of 10.1˚ from the centre, on
a black background at a visual angle of 15.2˚ in height and 11.3˚ in width. Dimensions again
replicated those used byWieser et al. [32]. Face configurations were again presented on a
ViewSonic G90ft 19 inch colour monitor attached to a Phillips personal computer with eye
movements again recorded via an SR Research Eyelink 2 (SR Research Ltd, Ontario, Canada)
using previously described settings. The programs that controlled the software were designed
in-house.
Procedure
Prior to commencing the eye-tracking task, participants were asked to read the participant
information sheet and give consent. Before commencing the experimental task, participants
were asked to complete the BFNE II [54], the Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN) [55], the Atten-
tional Control Scale [65], the Beck Depression Inventory II [58, 59] and the Beck Anxiety
Inventory [60].
Participants were then seated 57cm from the monitor. The experimental task was preceded
by 12 practice trials where participants were offered an opportunity to ask for clarity on the
task instructions and indicate that they had time to process and understand the meaning of the
sentences. Immediately prior to the experimental task, and prior to each trial block partici-
pants completed a nine-point calibration and validation sequence. At the start of each trial,
participants were presented with a prime statement for 2000ms that they were asked to read.
They were then presented with a drift correction where they were asked to fixate a dot before
being presented with a face to either the left or right of the screen for 1000ms. On the pro-sac-
cade block they were asked to look towards the face and in the anti-saccade block they were
asked to look to the opposite side of the screen to where the face appeared. The task is illus-
trated in Fig 1.
Eye movement data preparation
Data were again analysed using SR Research Ltd. Data Viewer 1.9.1 (Ontario, Canada). The
first saccade after onset of the face was taken as a saccadic measure. Anticipatory saccades,
improper fixations and low amplitude saccades were again excluded, as in experiment 1,
resulting in an average of 2.9% of trials for each participants being excluded. Percentages of
anti-saccades and pro-saccades were analysed relative to the number of valid trials across each
participant.
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Results
As recommended by Field [67] where Mauchly’s test was significant at below .75, the Green-
house Geisser correction was applied, and where it was significant with a value of above .75,
the Huynh-Feldt epsilon was instead applied.
Latencies
A 2x3x4 ANOVA with three repeated measures factors: task (anti/ pro); prime type (negative/
neutral/ positive) and face type (angry/ happy/ inverted/ neutral) revealed a significant main
effect of task for saccadic reaction time, F(1,71) = 410.23,MSE = 360.32, p< .001, partial đ2 =
.85. Latencies were significantly shorter for pro-saccades (M = 181.36ms, SE = 2.2) than for
anti-saccades (M = 265.49ms, SE = 5.05). Thus, the hypothesis that latencies would be shorter
in the pro than anti-saccade task was supported.
An anxiety group (3) x prime (3) x face type (4) ANOVA for the anti-saccade task revealed
a significant main effect of face, F(3,207) = 4.09,MSE = 539.61, p = .01, partial đ2 = .06. Bonfer-
roni corrected post-hoc comparisons revealed that there were significantly shorter mean laten-
cies before saccading away from angry (M = 261.27ms, SE = 5.08) compared to happy faces
(M = 268.98ms, SE = 5.42), p< .01. The means and standard errors for saccadic latency for
faces are illustrated in Fig 2.
There was no significant main effect of anxiety group on saccade latency for anti-saccades,
F(2,69) = .42,MSE = 22047.53, p = .66, partial đ2 = .01, Power = .12. There was no significant
main effect of prime, F(1.92, 132.72) = 0.03,MSE = 546.63, p = .97. There was also no signifi-
cant anxiety group x prime interaction, F(3.85, 132.78) = 1.58,MSE = 545.47, p = .19, partial
đ2 = .04, or anxiety group x face interaction, F(6, 207) = 0.65,MSE = 539.59, p = .69, partial
đ2 = .02. The prime x face interaction F(3.87,267.09) = 1.94,MSE = 1363.96, p = .12, partial
đ2 = .03 was also not significant. Crucially, the anxiety group x prime x face interaction was
also non-significant, F(7.74, 267.07) = 1.52,MSE = 1364.8, p = .15, partial đ2 = .04. Therefore,
the hypothesis that angry upright faces would overall be associated with faster latencies in the
anti-saccade task when compared to other face types was partially supported for happy faces.
However, the prediction that this effect would be exaggerated by social anxiety, but attenuated
by a non-threat prime, was not supported since there were no significant effects of anxiety
group or prime type.
Fig 1. Schematic of modified emotional face saccade task.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0197749.g001
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Accuracy
A three-way repeated measures ANOVA with task (pro/anti); prime (negative/ neutral/ posi-
tive) and valence (angry/ happy/ inverted/ neutral) found that the main effect of task for error
rates was significant F(1,71) = 86.13,MSE = .01, p< .001, partial đ2 = .55. Bonferroni pairwise
contrasts revealed that error rates were significantly higher for anti-saccades (M = 17%, SE =
.01) than for pro-saccades (M = .01%, SE = .01). Thus, the hypothesis that error rates for cor-
rect pro-saccades would be lower than those observed for correct anti-saccades was supported.
A 3 x 3 x 4 (anxiety x prime x face) ANOVA for errors on the anti-saccade task failed to
reveal a significant main effect for anxiety group F(2,69) = .84,MSE = .02, p = .44, partial đ2 =
.02. The main effect of prime was not significant F(2, 138) = 2.3,MSE = .02, p = .74, partial
đ2 = .04. Nor was the main effect of face type, F(2.89, 5.78) = .97,MSE = .02, p = .41, partial
đ2 = .09. The anxiety x prime x face interaction was also non-significant, F(12, 144) = 1.12,
MSE = .01, p = 0.07, partial đ2 = .34, as was the potential interaction for anxiety x prime
F(4,38) = .45,MSE = .01, p = .77, partial đ2 = .01.
Although there were no group differences as predicted, there was a significant anxiety x
face interaction, F(3.35 199.44) = 3.35,MSE = .05, p = .004, partial đ2 = .09. Bonferroni cor-
rected post-hoc comparisons revealed that error rates were significantly higher in the high
anxiety group only for neutral faces (M = 21.4%, SE = 3.3) relative to angry faces (M = 13.6%,
SE = 3.3, p = .002) and happy faces (M = 16.4%, SE = 3.2, p = .03). Thus, in partial support for
the hypothesis, regardless of context, the high anxiety group made significantly more errors to
Fig 2. Mean saccadic latency for faces in the anti-saccade task (bars denote standard errors).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0197749.g002
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neutral upright faces compared to angry or happy faces. The opposite (though non-significant)
pattern was observed in the low anxious group. The differences across groups and facial
expressions are illustrated in Fig 3.
Finally, because depression and general anxiety scores had been significantly higher in the
high anxiety group than the low anxiety group, correlations were conducted for depression
and generalised anxiety, with errors across each face emotion and prime type. No significant
correlations were found between depression or general trait anxiety and error rates for any of
the facial expressions.
Discussion
Saccadic latencies were as predicted shorter, and fewer errors were made in the pro-saccade
than anti-saccade task. There were also significantly shorter latencies before saccades were
made away from angry faces compared to happy faces in the anti-saccade task, but there was
no significant difference in latencies between angry and neutral faces. This suggests that angry
faces were processed efficiently and would indicate an automatic tendency to orient away from
them given that an angry face may indicate a social threat. Conversely with happy faces there
may be less motivation to look away as it would be associated with reward. This may indicate
general approach-avoidance for happy and angry faces respectively as Van Peer et al. [64] have
suggested.
Whilst there were no overall group differences for latencies or error data, in the anti-sac-
cade task, the high anxiety group made significantly more errors to neutral upright faces com-
pared to angry and happy faces, whilst the opposite (albeit non-significant) pattern was
observed in the low anxious group. This provides some evidence of avoidance of emotional
faces in high anxious participants, but conflicts with the findings of Wieser et al. [32] who
found that high anxious relative to moderately anxious participants had a higher error rate for
all faces.
One explanation for these results is that the high social anxiety group may have had more
indecision around neutral faces making it more difficult to inhibit them. This may have been
due to the emotional ambiguity of the face. The moderate group had similar error rates for all
face types, whilst the low social anxiety group demonstrated the opposite pattern to the high
social anxiety group, suggesting that both of the more extreme groups may respond differently
Fig 3. Mean anti-saccade errors across anxiety groups and face types (bars denote standard errors).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0197749.g003
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to emotional faces relative to neutral faces, but for different reasons. For example, the high
social anxiety group may be more sensitive to neutral faces because of the increased socio-eval-
uative processing required for more ambiguous faces, as we have proposed.
The higher error rate for neutral faces in the high social anxiety group may have been con-
sistent to some extent with the assertion of Carver and Scheier [68] regarding the effect of cog-
nitive load and anxiety in placing strain on the working memory system and precipitating goal
disengagement. The results also support Amir and Bomyea [43] who found that individuals
with social phobia had greater working memory performance for emotional than neutral
words, but that the reverse pattern was observed in non-phobic individuals. This is consistent
with the results in the current study since the opposite error pattern was also found in low
socially anxious participants, albeit without significant differences. This may suggest that the
high social anxiety group engaged in increased evaluative processing of neutral faces, which
may represent more ambiguous social cues.
The lower errors made with emotional faces may have been due to avoidance of them rela-
tive to neutral faces. This may have been due to the employment of more realistic faces than
those used in the Wieser et al. [32] study in which high socially anxious participants had a
higher mean error rate to all faces compared to moderately anxious participants. Indeed the
error rate for neutral faces in the current study was similar to the error rate for all faces in the
high anxiety group observed in the Wieser et al. [32] study.
This explanation is consistent with the findings of Helfinstein et al. [35] that under neutral
conditions a vigilant pattern towards threatening faces may emerge with a socially anxious
sample, but when the social threat is increased the pattern shifts towards avoidance. Therefore,
whilst there were more errors in the Wieser study [32], in the current study participants may
have been motivated to avoid emotional faces which they may be able to quickly assess as being
socially threatening but experienced more difficulty in interpreting the neutral faces. Addition-
ally, the stimuli used in the current study may have been perceived as being more socially
threatening than the avatars used in theWieser et al. study [32] because (i) they were more real-
istic looking photographic images of facial emotion and (ii) because they were preceded by
socio-evaluative primes which may have inflated the social relevance of the face. This may have
led to a pattern that is more consistent with avoidance rather than vigilance to emotional sti-
muli, indicated by the reduced error rate in the high anxiety group compared to neutral faces.
Individual differences across groups in levels of attentional control make it difficult to inter-
pret the results of anti-saccade tasks to some extent, and the sample must also be considered as
a potential reason for the differences between the results of the current study and those of Wie-
ser et al. [32]. However, even taking this into account, there appear to be some similar patterns
across these two sets of results. As well as the similarity between the error rates for neutral
faces in the current study and all face types in the Wieser et al. study [32] (which did not
employ a socio-cognitive load), the pattern for the latency data was analogous. Wieser et al.
[32] had a similar, although non-significant pattern of angry faces having shorter saccadic
latencies in the anti-saccade task relative to happy faces. The current results may have been
more extreme because the faces are preceded by social information which may enhance the
salience of the social threat of an angry face resulting in an avoidant response.
Finally, we observed no evidence of an inversion effect in experiment 2. The lack of an
inversion effect reinforces the weak effect found in Experiment 1, since the enhanced social
relevance of the faces in this experiment facilitated by increased socio cognitive load would be
likely to further ameliorate any face inversion effect. We would argue that the primes which
lead the viewer in some trials to consider the evaluative meaning of the expression would be
likely to cause them to attach more social significance to an upside-down face than they may
otherwise do.
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General discussion
The anti-saccade task has superb potential to accurately model the behaviour of individuals
high in social anxiety in social cognition research. We have argued that the social context of
the task should be strengthened and have proposed that this can be achieved by either intro-
ducing a social stressor by way of priming, or by providing forthcoming evaluation informa-
tion, which we predicted would lead to more replicable group behaviour with regard to
reactions to facial stimuli.
In experiment 1, participants were placed under a condition of social stress through the
provision of information that they would be required to undertake a speech task after they par-
ticipated in an anti-saccade task to emotional, neutral and inverted faces. Whilst some evi-
dence of an inversion effect was observed, no group differences in error rates or latencies were
seen. Whilst acknowledging these null results may simply indicate no observable effect of
social anxiety, it is possible that the social stressor employed may not have been strong enough
to pierce through effects driven by individual differences in performance.
Experiment 2 again featured an anti-saccade task. However, it was anticipated that the use
of a prime prior to each trial would, through manipulation of three prime types, afford a stron-
ger effect of socio-evaluative stress at regular but unpredictable intervals, thus magnifying the
social relevance of the faces employed in the task. Evidence supported this prediction, particu-
larly with regard to the high socially anxious group. Overall, we observed lower saccadic laten-
cies for anti-saccades from angry faces relative to happy faces, which we suggested was
indicative of the stronger social threat of such faces, relative to faces we associate with reward.
Even in the absence of full awareness of facial expressions, cognitions can be influenced by
threat faces. For example, greater amygdala responses to fear faces have been associated with a
negative interpretation bias in the absence of awareness of seeing the face [69]. Evidence of visual
imagery in a cortically blind patient has also been found to involve the fronto-parietal network
when imagining an angry person [70]. Indeed, in review of evidence from blindsight studies, Cele-
ghin, de Gelder and Tamietto [71] have suggested that anxiety can be associated with an increased
awareness of physiological responses whilst the individual is unaware of the stimuli that precipi-
tated these changes. Furthermore, evidence suggests that individual differences in anxiety influ-
ence amygdala response whether there is a conscious awareness of the stimuli or not [5].
It has been suggested that the superior colliculus may have a crucial role in global process-
ing, delivering information directly to extrastriate areas and other subcortical areas areas
involved in visual processing, without the need for direct input to V1 [72]. Using evidence
from monkeys, Nguyen et al. [73] have suggested that the superior colliculus begins encoding
face like stimuli as early as 25 ms post presentation onset. This may indicate an anticipatory
monitoring mechanism which precipitates inhibition as the superior colliculus projects to the
oculomotor areas involved with generating pro and anti-saccades and has been linked to the
preparation of saccade generation [74].
We observed evidence in the high socially anxious group for more errors being generated
to upright neutral faces relative to both happy and angry faces (with a non-significant mirror-
ing of this pattern observable for the low anxious group). This pattern in the high socially anx-
ious group can be viewed as indicative of inhibitory difficulties being driven by enhanced
indecision relating to the nature of neutral faces in this group. We would argue that it is possi-
ble this is being driven by the emotional ambiguity this group perceived in a face devoid of
clear emotional content, which subsequently required more socio-evaluative processing in the
high social anxious group relative to the other groups of participants.
Vuilleumier [75] suggested that neutral information is more dependent on direct attention
than emotional information and increased perceptual load has been linked to reduced
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processing of neutral distractors [76, 77]. This may have made it more difficult to inhibit neu-
tral faces leading to performance deficits in the antisaccade task. It is also possible that neutral
faces had been primed by preceding emotional faces. Indeed, Laptate et al. [69] found that
biases to neutral stimuli were influenced by the emotional valence of preceding stimuli. There-
fore, it is possible that those with higher social anxiety were primed more by preceding emo-
tional faces because emotion as a social evaluative signal is valued more in this group.
Whilst there remains much to do to further our argument, we conclude that we have pro-
vided evidence to support our assertion that a rich socio-cognitive load will enhance realistic
performance in static face paradigms designed to elicit group differences in socio cognitive
behaviour in the context of social anxiety.
There were some limitations with these initial studies however. The inverted control face
employed in experiment 2 was not effective in showing that upright facial expressions had any
differential effect generally on saccades relative to the inverted stimuli. However, we argued
that the control face may not have acted as anticipated, due to increased socio-cognitive pro-
cessing which may have given it more social relevance even when inverted. In addition, such
effects may have been more pronounced with faces with open mouths rather than closed
mouths. It should be noted that such faces were selected in order to enhance ecological validity
in a social context. However, we propose that it would be useful for researchers to include a
non-face control in future studies. An oval matched to size and skin colour may be one possi-
bility, or a scrambled face.
The lack of group differences despite the opposing patterns on errors rates may also reflect
the nature of the sample. It is conceded that there may not be a large enough split between
groups in terms of social anxiety scores resulting in effects not being as strong as they may
have been with a clinical sample. Another important factor to consider when interpreting the
results is the fact that depression and anxiety scores were significantly higher in the high anx-
ious group than the low anxious groups in both studies. Although the concurrence of depres-
sion and anxiety is a prevalent feature of social anxiety, this may have some influence on the
results. It should be noted however that neither depression nor generalised anxiety scores met
clinical cut-off levels, so the influence of these factors may have been relatively small. Neverthe-
less, they should be considered in such studies.
D’Argembeau, Van der Linden, d’Acremont, & Mayers [78] have discussed the issue of the
comorbidity of elevated depression and anxiety scores with social anxiety scores at some length
and concurred with Field [67] that ANCOVA is not an appropriate method for controlling a
factor that differs between groups. Furthermore, considering the significant comorbidity
between social anxiety and depression, e.g. [79, 80] it would be unrealistic and artificial to try
to isolate the effect of depression or anxiety and then generalise findings to the behaviour of
individuals with social anxiety and co-morbidity.
It is suggested that rather than attempting to control for these, researchers may be wise to
instead sample socially anxious participants with varying levels of depression and/or general-
ised anxiety. This approach would also enable researchers to control the influence of individual
differences in tasks such as the anti-saccade task to some extent. However, it should be noted
that in the current study there was no significant correlation between either depression or gen-
eral trait anxiety and error rates for any of the facial expressions. Therefore, there is no evi-
dence to suggest that depression or anxiety influenced the difference in error rates across facial
expressions in the high social anxiety group.
Given the apparent effect of the socio-cognitive load in increasing the social salience of the
emotional faces, it will be useful for researchers to manipulate different types of cognitive load
in a replication of this study in order to assess the relative contribution of social context to the
current results. Although there were no differences in latencies or errors as a result of prime
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types, the additional processing of social information is likely to have increased the social rele-
vance of the faces. However, to be sure that it was the social content that relevantly contrib-
uted, a logical next step is to replicate the study with perhaps a mathematical load to measure
the effect of processing non-social information on inhibition of faces.
In conclusion, we have argued that conditions of increased social salience are necessary to
minimise potential individual differences in performance, and such increases are better engen-
dered through the use of priming techniques than through the use of a potential performance
evaluation. Under conditions which do increase social salience, angry faces appear to be indic-
ative of a social threat. This is associated with a general avoidance response indicated by more
efficient processing before making an eye movement away from such a face, compared to a
more desirable socially affirming face. In addition, there appears to be an exaggerated avoid-
ance response for emotional faces in more socially anxious individuals. However, the ambigu-
ity of a neutral face may be more difficult to inhibit for socially anxious individuals, possibly
due to the increased social-evaluative processing required for this task. These findings have
implications for static face processing paradigms that lack a personally relevant socio-evalua-
tive component as results may not necessarily reflect the ambiguity elicited by processing the
self-relevant context of the face.
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